IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. 464 M.D. 2021
Carol Ann Carter; Monica Parrilla; Rebecca Poyourow; William Tung; Roseanne Milazzo; Burt Siegel; Susan Cassanelli; Lee Cassanelli; Lynn Wachman; Michael Guttman; Maya Fonkeu; Brady Hill; Mary Ellen Bachunis; Tom DeWall; Stephanie McNulty; and Janet Temin,

Petitioners,

VS.
Leigh Chapman, in Her Official Capacity as the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Jessica Mathis, in Her Official Capacity as Director of the Bureau of Election Services and Notaries,

Respondents.

No. 465 M.D. 2021
Philip T. Gressman; Ron Y. Donagi; Kristopher R. Tapp; Pamela A. Gorkin; David P. Marsh; James L. Rosenberger; Amy Myers; Eugene Boman; Gary Gordon; Liz McMahon; Timothy G. Feeman; and Garth Isaak

Petitioners, vs.

Leigh Chapman, in her Official Capacity as the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ; and Jessica Mathis, in Her Official Capacity as

Director of the Bureau of Election Services and Notaries,
Respondents.

PRE-HEARING OPENING BRIEF OF SENATE REPUBLICAN INTERVENORS JAKE CORMAN, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SENATE, AND KIM WARD, MAJORITY LEADER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SENATE

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Pursuant to the Court's January 14, 2022 order, Intervenors Jake Corman, President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate, and Kim Ward, Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate (together, "Senate Republican Intervenors"), jointly submit this pre-hearing opening brief.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Under federal law, based on the results of each decennial Census, each state is assigned and must draw a particular number of congressional districts. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; 2 U.S.C. § 2a. Under Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, congressional "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions for lawmaking." Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 808 (2015). But when the state's legislature and governor do not reach an agreement on a map, a court may be "left with the unwelcome obligation of performing in the legislature's stead, while lacking the political authoritativeness that the legislature can bring to the task." Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977). In whatever manner that it is adopted - through a legislature or a court - a redistricting map must comply with "traditional," constitutionally-derived criteria, as well as statutory requirements that pertain to voting rights. Beyond these factors, legislatures, as they engage in redistricting, may (and should) take into account a variety of other variables that relate to state policies and interests. It follows that, if a court is required to adopt a redistricting plan for a
state and is assessing which one to adopt, it should give special weight to any plan that has moved through the state's legislative process, so long as that plan meets the background redistricting requirements. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Meskill, 345 F. Supp. 962, 965 (D. Conn. 1972) (faced with obligation to select congressional redistricting map after state's governor vetoed legislature's map, court adopted the legislature's proposed plan, explaining that " $[t]$ he legislative adoption of Public Act 807 tips the scales in favor of the plan" and observing that the plan had "the added advantage that it is basically the plan adopted by the legislature").

## II. CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING REQUIREMENTS

## A. Traditional, Constitutionally-Derived Criteria

In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Article I, Section 5 of Pennsylvania Constitution, the "Free and Equal Elections Clause," to the Pennsylvania Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011. In doing so, it determined that, under the Free and Equal Elections Clause, the criteria in Article II, Section 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which apply to the creation of state legislative districts, likewise apply to congressional redistricting. The Court therefore concluded that, to pass constitutional muster, congressional redistricting maps must meet three traditional criteria: (1) compact and contiguous territory, (2) population equality as nearly as practicable, and (3) respect for the boundaries of political subdivisions and
dividing as few of those subdivisions as possible. League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 816 .

## 1. Compact and Contiguous Territory

A congressional district must be compact and contiguous. The compactness of a district "must be evaluated objectively and with allowance for the elements of unavoidable noncompactness." Com ex rel. Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 24 (Pa. 1972), abrogated on other grounds by Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 38 A.3d 711, 752 (Pa. 2012) ("Holt I"). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in League of Women Voters, "odd shapes and seemingly arbitrary political subdivision splits are not themselves sufficient to conclude" that a redistricting plan "is not predicated on the traditional redistricting factors." League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 819; see also Specter, 293 A. 2 d at 24 (stating that "a determination that a reapportionment plan must fail for lack of compactness cannot be made merely by a glance at an electoral map and a determination that the shape of a particular district is not aesthetically pleasing").

As for contiguity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that a contiguous district is one in which "a person can go from any point within the district to any other point (within the district) without leaving the district, or one in which no part of the district is wholly physically separate from any other part." Holt v.

2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 67 A.3d 1211, 1242 (Pa. 2013) ("Holt II') (quoting Specter, 293 A.2d at 23).

## 2. Population Equality As Nearly As Practicable

For purposes of a congressional redistricting plan, the representational districts must be equal in population as nearly as practicable. This requirement emanates from both Pennsylvania and federal constitutional law. Holt I, 38 A.3d 711 (noting that Article II, Section 16's population equality requirement "exists as an independent command of federal constitutional law, including decisional law which changes and evolves"). The federal constitutional overlay establishes a "high standard of justice and common sense" in requiring "equal representation for equal numbers of people." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)). Although "[p]recise mathematical equality . . . may be impossible to achieve in an imperfect world," the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the concept of "as nearly as practicable" to mean that deviations from exact population equality are permitted only when they are "unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown." Id. (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)).

## 3. Respect for Political Subdivision Boundaries

A redistricting plan should be "attentive to the concerns of historically unified subdivisions, such as County seats." Holt I, 38 A.3d at 758. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, "recognize[s] that the Pennsylvania Constitution permits absolutely necessary political subdivision splits, and that some divisions are inevitable." Id. For instance, subdivision splits can be "made absolutely necessary" by "competing constitutional, demographic, and geographic factors[.]" Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1240. Additionally, "redistricting efforts may properly seek to preserve communities of interest which may not dovetail precisely with the static lines of political subdivisions." Id. at 1241.

## B. Additional Factors

## 1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") prohibits the states and their instrumentalities and subdivisions from employing any "voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color" or language-minority status. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). "A violation" of this provision is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that "the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens [i.e., citizens of a
given race, color, or language minority] protected by [the VRA] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. Id. at § 10301(b). Under Section 2, a plaintiff need not "prove the discriminatory intent of state or local governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral mechanism." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71 (1986). A state, therefore, may be required to affirmatively take action in order to avoid a Section 2 violation.

In this regard, in order to prevail on a Section 2 claim, a plaintiff must first prove that the three "Gingles preconditions" are satisfied: (1) the minority group in question must be sufficiently compact to compose a majority in one or more singlemember representational districts; (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive; and (3) the majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the preferred candidates of the minority group. Jenkins v. Manning, 116 F.3d 685, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51).

The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that, for purposes of the first precondition, "a party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent." Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2009) (plurality opinion). Courts have also indicated that states cannot be required to draw minority "crossover" districts, i.e., districts that are composed of less than a strict $50 \%$ voting-
age majority population of the relevant minority group. Id. at 22-23. See also, e.g., United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594-95 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (defining the first Gingles precondition in terms of voting-age majority).

If the threshold Gingles preconditions are satisfied, the analysis turns on the totality of the circumstances, which involves a qualitative review of numerous factors. Jenkins, 116 F.3d at 690. The factors include "the extent of any history of official discrimination," "the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health," and "the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction." Id. "[T]here is no magical number of factors which must be shown to exist." Id.

## 2. The Fourteenth Amendment and Racial Gerrymandering

The Fourteenth Amended prohibits "the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (Shaw I). The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for evaluating "racial gerrymandering" claims. First, the plaintiff must show "that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district." Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (citation omitted). The question, in this regard, is whether "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). "Where a challenger succeeds in establishing racial predominance, the burden shifts to the State to 'demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.'" Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 800-01 (citation omitted).

## 3. Political Factors

In League of Women Voters, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that, under the Commonwealth's Constitution, factors like "protection of incumbents" and "the maintenance of the political balance which existed after the prior reapportionment" are allowed to play a role in the creation of a redistricting plan. 178 A.3d at 817 . But the court also concluded that, under the Free and Equal Elections Clause, those factors must be "wholly subordinate" to the "neutral [redistricting] criteria of compactness, contiguity, minimization of the division of political subdivisions, and maintenance of population equality among . . . districts." Id. The Court then stated (in dicta) that, when a redistricting body uses the subordinate factors as part of creating a redistricting plan, it may not "unfairly dilute the power of a particular group's vote for a...representative." Id. It did not attempt to define the contours of "unfair" vote-dilution.

## III. APPLICATION OF REDISTRICTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE PLAN

In tandem with this brief, and in accordance with Paragraph 3 in the January 14, 2022 order, the Senate Republican Intervenors are providing this Court with a "proposed 17-district congressional redistricting plan" that is "consistent with the results of the 2020 Census." In particular, the Senate Republican Intervenors are providing this Court with the plan that is embodied in HB 2146 (the "Legislative Plan"), which uses the Legislative Reapportionment Commission's dataset \#1. On January 12, 2022, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed HB 2416 and referred it to the Senate for consideration. The bill was referred to the Senate State Government Committee, which passed it on January 12, 2022. The Senate gave HB 2146 first consideration on January 18, 2022 and second consideration on January 19, 2022. The Senate is scheduled to be in session on January 24, 25, and 26, 2022, and HB 2146 is eligible for third consideration and final passage on any of those dates, or on any future legislative session that may be convened.

This brief is also accompanied by an expert report in which John Memmi, Ph.D, assesses the Legislative Plan.

Given what is evident on the face of the Legislative Plan and for the reasons that Dr. Memmi explains in his expert report, the plan satisfies all of the applicable redistricting requirements that are described above.

## IV. THE LEGISLATIVE PLAN IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE

As the U.S. Supreme Court has stressed, under Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, congressional "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions for lawmaking." Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 808 (2015); see also League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 821-22 (stating that the "primary responsibility and authority for drawing federal congressional legislative districts rests squarely with the state legislature"). Pennsylvania's legislative power (and therefore its power to engage in congressional redistricting) is vested exclusively in the General Assembly. See Pa. Const. art. II, § 1. Although the Court may intervene when the General Assembly and Governor do not reach an agreement on a map, there is no doubt that redistricting remains a fundamentally legislative act. The Legislative Map, which the Senate Republican Intervenors are submitting to the Court with this brief, is therefore entitled to deference and special weight as a reflection of the legislative process (given that the House has passed it and it is making its way through the Senate) and the will of the people's elected representatives.

In adopting remedial redistricting plans, courts have given special consideration to the policy judgments that are reflected in legislatively-designed maps. The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing a district court's rejection of a legislative map
in favor of a different map, described the legislative process as "the proper means toward the essentially political end of reapportionment." Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 918 (5th Cir. 1984). This "political process," the court noted, "involved just the sort of give-and-take between citizens and their elected officials that federal courts are unable to achieve." Id. The court further explained that federal courts must "honor state policies to the greatest extent possible when choosing among available plans or fashioning [their] own" and "when the court is presented with a legislative plan whose constitutional or statutory flaws are capable of correction by minor adjustments, Upham requires the court to minimize violence to those legislative policies embodied in the plan by changing it only to the extent necessary to cure its cognizable flaws." Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 918 (5 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1984) (citing Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982)). "In fashioning a reapportionment plan or in choosing among plans, a district court should not pre-empt the legislative task nor 'intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.'" White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971)).

The decision in Donnelly v. Meskill, 345 F. Supp. 962 (D. Conn. 1972) helps to illustrate the point. In Donnelly, the court was obligated to select a congressional redistricting map for Connecticut after the state's governor vetoed the state legislature's map. The court adopted the legislature's proposed plan, explaining that "[ $t$ ]he legislative adoption of Public Act 807 tips the scales in favor of the plan in

Exhibit B-1, which provides districts essentially as outlined by the legislature, with adjustments necessary to bring about virtually complete population equality." Id. at 965. The court recognized that the plan it adopted had "the added advantage that it is basically the plan adopted by the legislature." Id.

The same result is warranted here. Given that the House has passed it and it is moving through the Senate, the Legislative Map reflects a deliberative, legislative process, which involves negotiations, compromise, and policy judgments, and which the people's elected representatives are undertaking in order to memorialize and implement state policy that reflects the will of their constituents. The legislative process is one that, under both the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, is the principal and preferred method for drawing congressional districts. The Constitution does not envision that a supercomputer or individual expert witness will create a redistricting plan that will govern congressional elections for a decade. The Legislative Map, therefore, is entitled to deference from the Court in order to honor the General Assembly's constitutional prerogative to engage in redistricting.

## V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Senate Republican Intervenors respectfully request that the Court adopt the Legislative Map.

Dated: January 24, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Anthony R. Holtzman

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## CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the Case Records Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania that require filing confidential information and documents differently than nonconfidential information and documents.
/s/ Anthony R. Holtzman

Anthony R. Holtzman

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing document upon the persons and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121:

## Service by PACFile eService as follows:

All counsel of record

Date: January 24, 2022
/s/ Anthony R. Holtzman Anthony R. Holtzman

## Expert Report of John M. Memmi, Ph.D. in the Matter of Carter v. Degraffenreid, in The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, No. 464 M.D. 2021 (Consolidated) Congressional Redistricting Criteria Applied to Districts Under HB2146

My name is John Memmi. I am consultant in the field of redistricting. I have more than 20 years of experience with the process of drawing redistricting maps, particularly in Pennsylvania. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Appendix A.

I was retained on behalf of Jake Corman, President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate, and Kim Ward, Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate, who are Intervenors in this matter.

I was asked to evaluate the redistricting map associated with House Bill 2146 of 2021 in relation to traditional and applicable criteria for compactness, contiguity, population equality, and maintenance of political subdivisions.

To conduct this evaluation, I used generally accepted methodologies in the field of drawing and evaluating congressional redistricting maps. I relied on numerous sources of information, which are identified herein. Key references and data sources are listed in Appendix B. I am also generally informed by a broad range of technical literature relevant to congressional redistricting, and by my education and experience. The opinions expressed in this report are stated to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.

Based on my evaluation, I provide the following key opinions. These and additional opinions are further described in the subsequent sections of this report.

1. Compactness: HB2146 complies with this criterion.
2. Contiguity: HB2146 complies with this criterion.
3. Population Equality: HB2146 complies with this criterion.
4. Maintenance of Political Subdivisions: HB2146 complies with this criterion.

## Compactness

Compactness is a measure of the geographic shape of a district. Although many such measures are available, the two most common are Polsby-Popper and Reock. Polsby-Popper evaluates irregularity in the perimeter of a district and Reock examines district area.

Polsby-Popper and Reock scores range from 0 to 1 , the more compact the district the greater the score.

Figure 1 offers bar charts of and descriptive statistics on compactness scores for HB2146. Inspection of the charts reveals no district with an extreme (low) score, and the nearly equal range and standard deviation for each measure support this observation.

## Contiguity

Redistricting Law 2020 (NCSL, 2019, page 258) defines contiguity as the condition in which "all parts of a district are connected geographically at some point with the rest of the district." In Pennsylvania, drawing contiguous districts can be a challenge: the Pennsylvania State Data Center identifies 58 non-contiguous municipalities and 95 non-contiguous precincts (see Appendices C and D). For example, Lancaster Township, Lancaster County, comprises eight tracts, and Precinct 1, Pine Township, Mercer County, comprises nine tracts. Pennsylvania also has one non-contiguous county, Chester.

Despite these non-contiguities, HB2146 comprises 17 contiguous districts, as verified by autoBoundEDGE, redistricting software published by Citygate GIS.

## Population Equality

The Commonwealth must comprise 12 districts with total populations of 764,865 and five districts with total populations of 764,864 , for a grand total of $13,002,700$ persons.

HB2146 complies with this criterion, as listed in Table 1.

## Maintenance of Political Subdivisions

County and municipal governments function more efficiently when their jurisdictions are within one district. In theory, the only political subdivisions that must be split are those with total populations greater than one district. In 2020, three counties had such populations: Philadelphia (1,603,797 or 2.10 districts), Allegheny (1,250,578; 1.64), and Montgomery (856,553; 1.12).

A graphical and tabular summary of political subdivisions, both whole and split in HB2146, is given in Figure 2. The plan splits only 0.3 percent of the Commonwealth's 16,127 subdivisions.

Submitted by:
John M. Menmi
John M. Memmi

Figure 1. Compactness Scores for Congressional Districts Under HB2146


Reock


|  | Polsby-Popper | Reock |
| ---: | :---: | :---: |
| maximum | 0.49 | 0.62 |
| minimum | 0.19 | 0.30 |
| range | 0.30 | 0.32 |
| median | 0.29 | 0.40 |
| average | 0.32 | 0.42 |
| standard deviation | 0.10 | 0.08 |

Figure 2. Split Political Subdivisions in Congressional Districts Under HB2146


| Subdivision | Total | Split | \% Whole | \% Split | Total Splits |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Counties | 67 | 15 | $77.6 \%$ | $22.4 \%$ | 19 |
| Municipalities* | 2,572 | 19 | $99.3 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ | 21 |
| Wards | 4,310 | 9 | $99.8 \%$ | $0.2 \%$ | 9 |
| Precincts | 9,178 | 9 | $99.9 \%$ | $0.1 \%$ | 9 |
|  | Total | $\mathbf{1 6 , 1 2 7}$ | $\mathbf{5 2}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 . 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 3 \%}$ |

* includes 3 muncipalities that are split by county lines
Table 1. Total Population and Select Components for Congressional Districts Under HB2146



# APPENDIX A TO EXPERT REPORT OF JOHN MEMMI 

John M. Memmi, Ph.D.

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## Redistricting Experience

## Consultant <br> December 2017 - Present

- Providing redistricting expertise to confidential clients

Specialist PA State Senate Republican Caucus 2000-2002 and 2009-2013

- Generated Congressional and state senatorial test plans to achieve varying goals
- Produced 100s of hypothetical plans based on the following redistricting criteria:
- absolutely equal population
- voting rights
- traditional (compactness, contiguity, preservation of political units, preservation of communities of interest, preservation of district cores, incumbency protection)
- political (strong Democrat lean, strong Republican lean, competitive, proportional)
- Compiled, queried, and generated reports on population and political data for:
- 67 counties
- ~2,600 municipalities
- ~9,500 precincts
- 325,000-420,0000 census blocks
- Supplied maps and reports to the bipartisan Legislative Reapportionment Commission
- Determined Congressional seats in response to changing population estimates
- Aided litigation as both technical advisor and fact witness


## Additional Consulting Experience

Mineral Exploration: Ashton Mining, BHP, Kennecott
Information Technology: USDA Forest Service

## Education

Doctor of Philosophy, Geological Sciences, The Ohio State University

## APPENDIX B TO EXPERT REPORT OF JOHN MEMMI

## References

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autoBoundEDGE, 2020, Citygate GIS, https://citygategis.com/products/autoboundEDGE/
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## Northern Cambria borough <br> Cambria County

























APPENDIX d to expert report of john memmi
Non-Contigous VTDs Present in Final 2011 Submission

## Total: 95





## O HARA TWP WD 04 DIST 02 <br> Allegheny County







BRISTOL TWP WD 03 DIST 03
Bucks County
DOYLESTOWN TWP WD 06
Bucks County






NORTHERN CAMBRIA 03
Cambria County

BIRMINGHAM TWP PCT 02
Chester County
SCHUYLKILL TWP PCT 01
Chester County

MEADVILLE WD 02 PCT 01
Crawford County

DERRY TWP PCT 14
Dauphin County
NETHER PROVIDENCE 0601
Delaware County

RIDLEY TWP WD 06 PCT 01
Delaware County
















ALLENTOWN WD 17 DIST 04
Lehigh County


SOUTH WHITEHALL TWP DIST 02
Lehigh County


HERMITAGE VTD SW ED 03
Mercer County





## UPPER DUBLIN TWP VTD 05 ED 01 HD153 <br> Montgomery County





PALMER TWP VTD UPPER WESTERN
Northampton County












SPRING GARDEN TWP WD 02
York County
SPRING GARDEN TWP WD 02
SPRING GARDEN TWP WD 02

Preliminary Congressional Plan Amendment
Preliminary Congressional Plan Amendment Based on Holt Map
(7
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